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Multinational enterprises (MNEs) play a significant role with 
worldwide subsidiaries in the global economy. MNEs generally dominate 
agreements with their offshore subsidiaries in promoting their global 
operations. How to hold MNEs liable for the tortious acts of their 
offshore subsidiaries is a pressing issue. National courts, international 
norms and MNEs’ internal codes of conduct cannot legally and 
effectively hold MNEs liable for their offshore subsidiaries’ tortious acts.  
After the Supreme Court case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in 1980, the 
U.S. Alien Tort Statue (ATS) rose to provide a mechanism to hold MNEs 
liable for offshore tortious acts. Suits filed under the ATS have caused 
conflict in United States courts in the past, including those related to the 
issue of corporate ATS liability. The Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co. in 2013 asserted that the ATS could only apply to 
violations occurring within the territory of the United States. Half a year 
later, with facts similar to those in Kiobel, the Supreme Court in Daimler 
AG v. Bauman in January 2014 asserted that ATS litigation should also 
satisfy the strict general jurisdiction requirement. Thus, many cases are 
filtered out of United States courts due to the ATS’s territorial limitation 
and jurisdictional limitation. Barriers to post-Daimler litigating under 
the ATS to hold MNEs liable for the tortious acts of offshore subsidiaries 
are difficult to pass through. These barriers could include the principle 
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of presumption against extraterritorial application, the limitation of 
personal jurisdiction, and international comity, among other barriers. 
The United States seems to have closed the door for transnational 
litigation to hold MNEs liable for the tortious acts of offshore 
subsidiaries. 
Even though United States courts are returning to their original 
position prior to the rise of ATS litigation, several strategies to impose 
liability on MNEs for the acts of offshore subsidiaries after Kiobel and 
Daimler might achieve success, including the correct application of the 
ATS, litigation in state courts or under state law, the expansion of the 
piercing the corporate veil doctrine and obtainment of consent from 
parties.  
INTRODUCTION 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs), usually comprised of companies 
which are located in different countries, exert significant influence over 
and share knowledge and resources with each other.1 MNEs are 
supported by a complex and opaque web that extends across the globe. 
Its global network of subsidiaries and affiliate companies plays a 
significant role in the MNEs’ global operations. 
Traditionally, United States courts could not hold MNEs liable for the 
acts of their offshore subsidiaries due to territorial and sovereign 
limitations.2 However, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has provided a 
mechanism for aliens to bring claims against individuals and 
corporations for tortious conduct committed abroad. The statute 
expressly grants subject matter jurisdiction to United States courts and 
provides the opportunity for victims to be awarded “domestic 
remedies.”3 After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala4 in 1980, ATS litigation was on 
the rise after being ignored for 170 years. ATS became a tool to bring 
claims against MNEs for their offshore acts, and provided a possible 
  
 1. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, 15 I.L.M. 9 at 2 (1976) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. 
 2. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720, 736 (1877) (holding that a tribunal’s 
jurisdiction over persons reaches no father than the geographic bounds of the forum). 
 3. Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 61, 61 (2008). 
 4. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir 1980). 
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mechanism to hold MNEs liable for their offshore subsidiaries’ acts. 
However, in the milestone case Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. in 
June 2013, the Supreme Court asserted that the ATS could only apply to 
violations of the law of nations occurring within the United States.5 Half 
a year later, with facts similar to those in Kiobel, the Supreme Court in 
Daimler AG v. Bauman in January 2014, asserted that ATS litigation 
should also satisfy the strict general jurisdiction requirement.6 Even 
though United States courts are returning to their original position prior 
to the rise of ATS litigation, several strategies are emerging to hold 
MNEs liable for their offshore subsidiaries’ acts after Daimler.  
This paper inquires as to how to assert MNEs’ responsibility 
regarding their offshore subsidiaries’ acts. This paper will explore and 
explain possible strategies to hold MNEs liable for its offshore 
subsidiaries’ acts after the cases Kiobel and Daimler, even with difficult 
barriers to these strategies to cross. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. The paper begins with the 
operation of MNEs in Part I with the case of Apple Inc. Part II explains 
that national courts, international norms, and MNEs’ internal codes of 
conduct cannot legally and effectively hold MNEs liable for their 
offshore subsidiaries’ acts. Part III examines the ATS as a mechanism to 
hold MNEs liable for subsidiaries’ tortious acts, with a focus on the issue 
of corporate ATS liability by analyzing a series of cases in U.S. courts. 
Part IV explains that holding MNEs liable for offshore subsidiaries’ acts 
would still meet difficult barriers, including the due process doctrine, the 
principle against the application of extraterritorial statues, the 
requirement of personal jurisdiction and the principal of international 
comity. Part V discusses the possible alternatives to hold MNEs liable 
for offshore subsidiaries acts, including the correct application of the 
ATS, litigation in state courts or state law, the expansion of the doctrine 
of piercing the corporate veil, the obtainment of consent from parties, 
and the newly arising principal-agent theory for piercing the corporate 
veil set forth in Daimler. This paper concludes that even though the 
attitude of United States courts seems to be retracting from the earlier 
rise of the use of the ATS, there are still alternatives to impose liability 
on MNEs for their offshore subsidiaries’ acts. It is suggested that new 
  
 5. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013). 
 6. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760-61 (2014). 
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thinking, such as improving the principal-agent theory to pierce the 
corporate veil, should be utilized to hold MNEs liable for offshore 
subsidiaries acts after Kiobel and Daimler. This paper asserts that these 
new strategies would achieve success, even though they face difficult 
substantive and procedural obstacles. 
I. MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES’ GLOBAL OPERATIONS 
The operations of MNEs across state borders are an increasingly 
important part of global economic activity. MNEs are involved in 80 
percent of global trade.7 Of more than 100,000 MNEs, the overwhelming 
majority are based in the advanced economies of developed countries 
with many developing countries playing host to their 900,000 
subsidiaries.8 
MNEs play an important role in the world economy and are the 
driving forces of economic globalization.9 The global network of 
production is primarily based upon the transnational activities of such 
companies. “About 60 percent of global trade, which today amounts to 
more than $20 trillion, consists of trade in intermediate goods and 
services that are incorporated at various stages in the production process 
of goods and services for final consumption.”10 
For example, Apple Inc. operates numerous manufacturing facilities 
and distribution centers, and their business activities are conducted in 
distant and inconsistently regulated environments, often with little or 
irregular monitoring.11 Apple has 63,000 employees located in different 
  
 7. United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev. (UNCTAD), World 
Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development 
134 (2013). 
 8. Robert D. Hormats, The Continuing Importance of Investment in the Global 
Economy (April 20-23, 2012),  
http://webplus.nankai.edu.cn/picture/article/33/61/08/b3d1d25f4786a98063814141b26e/7
4a64f0b-d603-4298-97dc-b0479578569f.pdf. 
 9. See Peter Malanczuk, Globalization and the Future Role of Sovereign States, 
in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE (Friedl Weiss et al. eds., 1998). 
 10. UNCTAD, supra note 7, at 122. 
 11. Kriss Deiglmeier, Transparency in Supply Chains: A Convergence of 
Possibilities, STANFORD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS (Feb. 4, 2013, 12:50 PM),  
http://csi.gsb.stanford.edu/transparency-supply-chains-convergence-possibilities. 
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subsidiaries worldwide.12 Around ninety percent of all of the components 
for its iPhones, for example, are engineered, manufactured, and 
assembled in Asia, Europe, and Africa.13 Apple’s “[a]dvanced 
semiconductors have come from Germany and Taiwan, memory from 
Korea and Japan, display panels and circuitry from Korea and Taiwan, 
chipsets from Europe and rare metals from Africa and Asia. And all of it 
is put together in China.”14  
MNEs play a leading and active role with offshore subsidiaries 
located around the world. MNEs with a multitude of potential sources are 
in a strong position to dictate contractual terms with subsidiaries.15 The 
agreements between MNEs and their subsidiaries usually contain the 
price, the pattern, the materials, the quality and quantity. The subsidiaries 
have to follow the strict requirements from MNEs to support the MNEs’ 
global operations. The subsidiaries are in a relatively weak position when 
facing MNEs. For instance, the General Distributor Agreement between 
DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft (DCAG) with headquarters in 
Germany and the United States subsidiary Mercedes-Benz USA 
(MBUSA) contains fully detailed information about standards, price, 
management personal, service, MBUSA’s authority and ownership, 
trademark, and so on.16  
II.   THE ROLE OF NATIONAL COURTS, INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND 
INTERNAL CODES OF CONDUCT IN HOLDING MNES LIABLE FOR THE 
ACTS OF OFFSHORE SUBSIDIARIES 
A.  The Role of the National Court in Holding a MNE Liable for its 
Offshore Subsidiary’s Acts: In China 
If there are means to hold MNEs liable for offshore subsidiaries’ acts, 
one is that they should go through national law or national courts where 
  
 12. Charles Duhigg & Keith Bradsher, How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/business/apple-america-
and-a-squeezed-middle-class.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Frederick Mayer & William Milberg, Aid for Trade in a World of Global 
Value Chains: Chain Power, the Distribution of Rents and Implications for the Form of 
Aid 5 (The Univ. of Manchester, Working Paper No. 34, 2013). 
 16. Bauman v. DailmerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 914-917 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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subsidiaries are located to hold the MNEs liable. As an example, we 
assume China to be where a MNE’s subsidiary is located. The analysis is 
similar in most situations, no matter where a MNE’s subsidiary is 
located. 
1. Bringing Claims in Chinese Courts 
Article 30 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 
states that “[a] company or enterprise which commits an act endangering 
society that is considered a crime under the law shall bear criminal 
responsibility.”17  As to how a company could assume criminal 
responsibility, Article 31 of the Criminal Law states that “[t]he person in 
charge and other personnel who are directly responsible shall also bear 
criminal responsibility.”18 In the General Principles of the Civil Law of 
the People’s Republic of China,19 there is corporate civil liability. A 
corporation is regarded as a legal person.20 Article 106 states that 
“[c]itizens and legal persons who breach a contract or fail to fulfill other 
obligations shall bear civil liability.”21 “Citizens and legal persons, who 
through their fault encroach upon State or collective property or the 
property or person of other persons, shall bear civil liability.”22 Civil 
liability shall still be borne even in the absence of fault, if the law so 
stipulates. 
As to how to bring suit in Chinese courts, Article 108 of the Civil 
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China states: 
The following conditions must be met before a lawsuit is filed: (1) The 
plaintiff must be a citizen, legal person, or an organization having a 
  
 17. Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Xingfa (୰⋶ேẸඹ࿴ᅜฮἲ(1997ಟ孊)) 
[Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (97 Revision)] (promulgated by the 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 1997, effective Dec. 25, 1999) [hereinafter Criminal 
Law]. 
 18. Id. art. 31. 
 19. Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Mingfa Tongze (୰⋶ேẸඹ࿴ᅜẸἲ㏻⇁) 
[General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by 
the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Aug. 27, 2009) art. 5. [hereinafter Civil 
Law]. 
 20. Id. art. 41. 
 21. Id. art. 106. 
 22. Id. 
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direct interest with the case; (2) There must be a specific defendant; (3) 
There must be concrete claim, a factual basis, and a cause for the 
lawsuit; and (4) The lawsuit must be within the scope of civil lawsuits 
to be accepted by the people’s courts and within the jurisdiction of the 
people’s court to which the lawsuit is filed.23 
Article 29 of Civil Procedure Law states, a lawsuit brought on a 
tortious act shall be under the jurisdiction of the people’s court of the 
place where the tort is committed or where the defendant has his 
domicile.24 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Choice of Law for 
Foreign-related Civil Relationships is the main statute to determine how 
the law applies to foreign-related civil relations.25 Article 8 states that the 
classification of foreign-related civil relations is governed by the law of 
the forum.26 Based on this classification, tortious liability is governed by 
the law of the place whether the tortious act occurred. Where the parties 
have common habitual residence, the law of their common habitual 
residence shall be applied.27 Where the parties have chosen by agreement 
an applicable law after the tortious act occurs, the agreement shall be 
followed.28  
Chinese courts could deal with such disputes if the offshore 
subsidiaries’ tortious acts occur in China. The fourth requirement—
whether the national court has jurisdiction over a United States MNE—is 
  
 23. Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Mingshi Susong Fa 
(୰⋶ேẸඹ࿴ᅜẸ஦孱孤ἲ(2007ಟṇ)) [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (2007 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 
28, 2007) art. 108 [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law]. 
 24. Id. art. 29. 
 25. Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Shewai Minshi Guanxi Falv Shiyong Fa 
(୰⋶Ṣ㮹ℙ␴⚥㴱⢾㮹ḳℛ䲣㱽⼳循䓐㱽) [Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on Choice of Law for Foreign-related Civil Relationships] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2011). art. 2 (“The laws 
applicable to foreign-related civil relations shall be determined in accordance with this 
law. Where other statutes have a special and different provision on the law applicable to a 
foreign-related civil relation, that provision shall be followed. Where no applicable law to 
a foreign-related civil relation has been specified in this law or other statutes, the law that 
is most closely connected with the foreign-related civil relation shall be applied.”) 
[hereinafter Choice of Law for Foreign-related Civil Relationships]. 
 26. Id. art. 8. 
         27.  Id. art. 44. 
 28. Id. 
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critical here. As to the jurisdiction, there are four kinds of jurisdiction in 
China: territorial jurisdiction,29 personal jurisdiction,30 protection 
jurisdiction31 and universal jurisdiction.32 In general, Chinese courts 
cannot govern foreign MNEs for their Chinese subsidiaries’ acts due to 
territorial limitations. China only recognizes universal jurisdiction in 
serious violations of the laws of nations, such as crimes against 
humanity.  The only remaining probable way is to pierce the corporate 
veil to discover whether a Chinese court could govern United States 
MNEs in such a case.  
2. Piercing the Corporate Veil Doctrine in China 
As a general principle, upon incorporation, a company has an 
independent personality separate from its corporate members.33  The 
limited liability principle as the basis of a corporation provides many 
benefits: it decreases the need to monitor agents; it reduces the costs of 
monitoring other shareholders; it gives managers incentives to act 
efficiently; and it allows for more efficient diversification and facilitates 
optimal investment decisions.34 
  
 29. Criminal Law, supra note 17, art. 6 (“This law is applicable to all who 
commit crimes within the territory of the PRC except as specially stipulated by law.”). 
 30. Id. art. 7 (“This Law shall be applicable to any citizen of the People’s 
Republic of China who commits a crime prescribed in this Law outside the territory and 
territorial waters and space of the People’s Republic of China; however, if the maximum 
punishment to be imposed is fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years as 
stipulated in this Law, he may be exempted from the investigation for his criminal 
responsibility. This Law shall be applicable to any State functionary or serviceman who 
commits a crime prescribed in this Law outside the territory and territorial waters and 
space of the People’s Republic of China.”). 
 31. Id. art. 8 (“This law may be applicable to foreigners, who outside PRC 
territory, commit crimes against the PRC state or against its citizens, provided that this 
law stipulates a minimum sentence of not less than a three-year fixed term of 
imprisonment for such crimes; but an exception is to be made if a crime is not punishable 
according the law of the place where it was committed.”). 
 32. Id. art. 9 (“This law is applicable to the crimes specified in international 
treaties to which the PRC is a signatory state or with which it is a member and the PRC 
exercises criminal jurisdiction over such crimes within its treaty obligations.”). 
 33. Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd., [1897] A.C. 22 at 40. (H.L.). 
 34. WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 97 (3d. ed 2012). 
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Under the limited liability principle, shareholders’ responsibilities are 
limited within their investments in the company. However, the risk of 
operating an enterprise can be shifted to outside parties, such as creditors 
and tort victims. Hence, under specific circumstances, the corporate veil 
could be pierced and shareholders could be held liable for the obligations 
of the company beyond their investments in the company. The first case 
about veil piercing on behalf of involuntary creditors was Walkovszky v. 
Carlton in 1966.35  
China formally introduced the doctrine of “piercing the corporate 
veil” in its Company Law in 2005,36 attracting widespread public and 
academic attention at home and abroad.37 The central provision of the 
Chinese veil piercing law is contained in Article 20(3) of the Company 
Law, which reads: “Where the shareholder of a company abuses the 
independent status of the company as a legal person or the limited 
liability of shareholders, evades debts and thus seriously damages the 
interests of the creditors of the company, he shall bear joint liability for 
the debts of the company.”38 There are three key elements that must be 
satisfied if the court is to pierce the corporate veil: (1) misconduct: it 
must be established that the principle of separate legal personality and 
limited liability were abused by the shareholder; (2) intent: the abusive 
behavior was intended to evade the debt payment; and (3) consequence: 
the abuse caused serious damage to the creditors’ interests.39  
Based on a narrow textual interpretation of Article 20(3) of the 
Company Law, it has been asserted that the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil applies only to debt situations, such as private contractual 
  
 35. Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966). 
 36. Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Gongsifa (୰⋶ேẸඹ࿴ᅜබྖἲ) [The 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective July 1, 1994) [hereinafter Company Law]. 
 37. See Mark Wu, Piercing China’s Corporate Veil: Open Questions from the 
New Company Law, 117 YALE L.J. 329 (2007). 
 38. Company Law, supra note 36, art. 20. 
 39. ᮒឿ囓, බྖἲேே᱁ྰ孌烉Ṷ㱽㜉嵫ℍ⭆嶝炻˪㶭⋶㱽⬎˫2007 (2). 
Ciyun Zhu㸪 Disregarding Corporate Personality: From Law to Practice 1(2), 
TSINGHUA L. J. 009, 012 (2007) (“Where any shareholder of a company evades the 
payment of debts by abusing the independent status of corporate legal person and the 
shareholders’ limited liability, and thus seriously damages the interests of any creditors, it 
shall bear joint liability for the debts of the company.”). 
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deals, thereby excluding tort claims.40 However, other scholars advocate 
a more liberal interpretation of the term “creditor” to include business 
partners, tort victims and other types of creditors.41 The Chinese courts 
seem to adopt an approach in the middle: creditors can include tort 
victims, but not others, such as governmental agencies. Even if 
“creditors” include tort victims, the next difficult issue is how to decide 
the meaning of the word “abuse” as set forth in the three elements. The 
most typical situation is where one or more of the investors has failed to 
pay in the subscribed registered capital, or pays but then immediately 
withdraws it. Courts may pierce the corporate veil: when the parent 
company mixes its assets with the assets of the newly established 
company; where the parent company treats the company’s assets as its 
own; or where the parent company ignores the subsidiary’s corporate 
structure and exercises direct control over the subsidiary. From January 
1, 2006 to December 31, 2010, there were only six cases related to 
piercing the parent corporate veil, not to mention when the parent’s 
subsidiary is offshore.42 In sum, it is difficult to find that MNEs have 
abused their powers, and subsequently, to hold them responsible for their 
offshore subsidiaries’ tortious acts under the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil. 
Given this detailed analysis of the Chinese legal system, the national 
court is unlikely to be able to hold MNEs liable for their offshore 
subsidiaries’ conduct both effectively and legally. We next examine 
whether international principles or internal code of conducts could hold 
MNEs liable for offshore subsidiaries’ acts.  
B.  The Role of International Principles in Holding MNEs Liable 
for Offshore Subsidiaries’ Acts 
At the international level, there are several commonly recognized 
norms and guidelines of regulating MNEs’ behavior, including their 
subsidaries’ offshore acts. 
  
 40. Wu, supra note 37, at 334-35. 
 41. Xinhu Lei & Bin Liu, Expanding the Scope of the Body Eligible to Bring 
Piercing Cases, 27(4) J. POL. SCI. & L. 5 (2010). 
 42. Hui Huang, Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: Where Is It Now and 
Where Is It Heading?, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 743, 755 (2012). 
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The Norms on The Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights explicitly states 
that MNEs shall respect rights to equal opportunity and non-
discrimination treatment, rights to security of persons, rights of workers 
and human rights.43 The Norms provide for a three-step implementation 
mechanism. First, MNEs are expected to “adopt, disseminate and 
implement internal rules of operation in compliance with the Norms” and 
incorporate the Norms in their contracts with all business partners.44 
Second, the Norms require transparent and independent monitoring 
systems through the United Nations, and other national and international 
instruments which already exist or need to be created.45 Third, national 
states should ensure implementations of the Norms through their legal 
and administrative framework.46 Moreover, the Norms provide for 
reparations, restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation for any damage 
done or property taken from the victims of non-compliance with the 
Norms.47  
However, the Norms have certain limitations. They rely on 
monitoring mechanisms without specifying exactly which agencies they 
are referring to and without formulating an obligation to establish any. It 
is unclear which tribunals are appropriate for determining the 
remedies,and whether both national and international tribunals can do 
so.48 This issue is of significance where MNEs operate with subsidiaries 
in many different countries. Moreover, there are no clear and appropriate 
guidelines on procedures. What’s more, the implementation of the 
Norms relies heavily on national states, which are reluctant to oppose 
MNEs.49 
The UN Global Compact asks companies to embrace universal 
principles and to partner with the United Nations.50 The UN Global 
  
 43. U.N. ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL, U.N. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003), at 4-5 
[hereinafter Norms]. 
 44. Id. at 6. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Regina E. Rauxloh, A Call for the End of Impunity for Multinational 
Corporations, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 297, 305 (2008). 
 50. Overview of the UN Global Impact, UN GLOBAL COMPACT,  
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Compact affirms that “[b]usinesses should support and respect the 
protection of . . .  human rights”51 and to “not [be] complicit in human 
rights abuses.”52 In addition, businesses are required to eliminate “all 
forms of forced and compulsory labour.”53 Unlike the Norms, the UN 
Global Compact relies on  MNEs’ cooperation rather than monitoring or 
policing them.54  Neither independent monitoring mechanisms nor any 
sanction or compensation for the victims are offered.  
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are recommendations 
jointly addressed by governments to MNEs.55 They provide principles 
and standards of good practice consistent with applicable laws and 
internationally recognized standards.56 Observance of OECD Guidelines 
is voluntary and not legally enforceable. OECD Guidelines provide for 
so-called National Contact Points (NCP).57 As national offices, their task 
is to promote and to implement the Guidelines. They receive and assess 
complaints against MNEs who are alleged to have breached the 
Guidelines. If an NCP decides the issue deserves further consideration, 
they offer assistance to the parties in resolving the disagreement.58 The 
defect of such a mechanism is that there are no sanctions against MNEs 
for not obeying the Guidelines.59 In addition, the NCP has the discretion 
  
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) 
(“The UN Global Compact is a strategic policy initiative for businesses that are 
committed to aligning their operations and strategies with ten universally accepted 
principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption.” It is a 
critical platform for the UN to engage effectively with enlightened global business). 
 51. Global Compact Principle One, UN GLOBAL COMPACT,  
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle1.html (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
 52. Global Compact Principle Two, UN GLOBAL COMPACT,  
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/Principle2.html (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
 53. Global Compact Principle Four, UN GLOBAL COMPACT,  
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/Principle4.html (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
 54. Overview of the UN Global Impact, supra note 50. 
 55. OECD Guidelines, Preface, para. 1. 
 56. Id. 
 57. OECD Guidelines, Foreword, para. 3. 
 58. Barnali Choudhury, Beyond the Alien Tort Claims Act: Alternative 
Approaches to Attributing Liability to Corporations for Extraterritorial Abuses, 26 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 43, 64 (2005). 
 59. Id. 
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to decide whether the complaint requires further action.60 This role of 
gatekeeper to the system for national offices is problematic as it often 
does not lie in the state’s best interest to act against MNEs. 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is the treaty that 
established the International Criminal Court (ICC).61 The Rome Statue 
established four core international crimes: genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression.62 Putting paragraphs (1), 
(2), and (3) of Article 25 of the Rome Statute together, there can be no 
doubt that by limiting criminal responsibility to individual natural 
persons, the Rome Statute implicitly negates the punishability of 
corporations and other legal entities. In the same line, it has already been 
stated by the International Military Tribunal that international crimes 
“are committed by men, not by abstract entities.”63 Importantly, the 
Security Council cannot, in a referral of a situation to the ICC under 
Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, extend the jurisdiction to legal 
persons.64 The confinement to natural persons is a fundamental 
characteristic of the ICC, and the ICC would not be bound or even have 
the right to extend its jurisdiction beyond natural persons. Nor can the 
Security Council instruct the ICC Prosecutor to target individuals 
involved in criminal corporate activities, as this would impinge on the 
prosecutorial discretion of the ICC Prosecutor.65 
In sum, the Norms, the UN Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines 
and the Rome Statute do have an indirect relevance. They are useful in 
promoting respectful behavior in MNEs and preventing the activities a 
corporation should refrain from. Moreover, they make it nearly 
impossible for a corporation to claim ignorance that business activities 
are intertwined with gross violations of human rights. However, these 
  
 60. Implementation Procedures of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, Part I C, para. 2 (the NCP will “make an initial assessment of whether the 
issues raised merit further examination and respond to the parties involved.”). 
 61. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 62. Id. art. 5. 
 63. Trial of the Major War Criminals, at 223 (Int’l Military Tribunal Nov. 14, 
1945-Oct. 1, 1946), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf. 
 64. Rome Statute, supra note 61, art. 13(b). 
 65. Model Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court Based on the 
Preparatory Committee’s Text to the Diplomatic Conference, Rome, June 15-July 17, 
1998, at 42 (Leila Sadat Wexler & M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 1998). 
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provisions are non-binding, unenforceable and, therefore, largely 
ineffective in holding MNEs liable, not to mention in holding MNEs 
liable for their offshore subsidiaries’ acts. In addition, often the 
effectiveness of these provisions depends on national enforcement, 
which has its own limitations as governments are often either unwilling 
or unable to effectively regulate and control MNEs.  
C.   The Role of MNEs’ Internal Codes of Conduct in Holding 
MNEs Liable for Offshore Subsidiaries’ Acts 
Internal codes of conduct are commitments voluntarily made by 
companies, which set forth standards and principles for the conduct of 
business activities in the marketplace. These voluntary codes are 
designed to demonstrate a notion of corporate responsibility to 
consumers. These codes can be used for subsidiaries, affiliates or at any 
other level of corporate involvement that is appropriate. The Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) code of conduct is such an example of 
MNEs’ internal codes of conduct.66 
It is not common for MNEs to set codes of conduct detailing the 
social and environmental performance standards for their global 
operations.67 Companies are beginning to apply their CSR codes to 
members of MNEs.68  
Codes of conduct, however, cannot hold MNEs liable for offshore 
subsidiaries’ acts. For example, in Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the 
plaintiffs in Wal-Mart’s contractors’ foreign factories brought suit 
against Wal-Mart for suffering substandard, grueling work-conditions in 
each of their employer’s factories.69 The plaintiffs asserted that Wal-Mart 
was liable to them because it had promised that it would monitor the 
suppliers’ compliance through a code of conduct in its supplier 
  
 66. Lance Compa, Corporate Social Responsibility and Workers’ Rights, 30 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’ Y J. 1, 3-4 (2008). 
 67. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012: Toward a New Generation of 
Investment Policies 93. 
 68. UNCTAD, Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Value Chains: 
Evaluation and monitoring challenges for small and medium sized suppliers in 
developing countries 3 (2012) (noting 82% of MNEs applying CSR codes to their first-
tier supplier, 23% apply to the 2nd tier or beyond). 
 69. Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 679-80 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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agreements.70  The plaintiffs asserted that they were third party 
beneficiaries of that contract because “Wal-Mart necessarily intended to 
benefit Plaintiffs by incorporating its code of conduct in its supplier 
agreements, and making a binding commitment to enforce the code for 
Plaintiffs’ benefit.”71 However, the court held there was no duty to 
inspect the contractor.72 The court found that the contract was between 
the corporation and the contractor and that “no such promise flows to 
Plaintiffs as third-party beneficiaries.”73  Even though this case is about 
MNEs and its contractors, the court would not hold the MNE liable for 
its offshore subsidiaries’ acts according to the internal code of conduct 
under the third party beneficiary doctrine, except by piercing the 
corporate veil, which will be discussed below. 
An internal code of conduct could develop some legal consequences, 
but it is still far-reaching to hold MNEs liable for offshore subsidiaries’ 
tortious acts. 
In all, national courts cannot hold MNEs liable for offshore 
subsidiaries’ conduct directly. Various international norms are non-
binding, unenforceable and, therefore, largely ineffective to hold MNEs 
liable. An internal code of conduct could develop some legal 
consequences, but is too far-reaching to hold MNEs liable for offshore 
subsidiaries’ tortious acts. In all, national courts, international norms, and 
the MNEs’ internal codes of conduct cannot legally and effectively hold 
MNEs liable for offshore subsidiaries’ tortious acts. 
  
 70. Id. at 680-81. 
 71. Appellants’ Reply Brief at III.B.3, Doe I, 572 F.3d 677 (No. 08-55706) 2008 
WL 6690743, at *7. 
 72. Doe I, 572 F.3d at 684, 685. 
 73. Id. at 682 (quoting Marina Tenants Ass’n v. Deauville Marina Dev. Co., 226 
Cal. Rptr. 321, 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)) (“A third party beneficiary cannot assert greater 
rights than those of the promisee under the contract.”). 
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III.  ATS AS A MECHANISM TO HOLD MNES LIABLE FOR OFFSHORE 
ACTS: CONFLICTING OPINIONS ABOUT CORPORATE LIABILITY 
UNDER THE ATS 
A.  ATS Litigation as a Mechanism to Hold Offshore Tortious Acts 
Liable 
The ATS provides a mechanism for aliens to bring claims for tortious 
conduct committed abroad. As stated in the Judiciary Act of 1789, “[t]he 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”74 We could infer that there must be three 
elements to bring ATS litigation: tort actions, aliens and violations of the 
law of nations. Law of nations includes war crimes and crimes against 
humanity; in other words, crimes in which the perpetrator can be called 
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.75  
The statute expressly grants subject matter jurisdiction to United 
States courts and provides the opportunity for victims to be awarded 
“domestic remedies.”76  The ATS was initially ignored by attorneys and 
was infrequently utilized for over 170 years.77 It was not until the early 
1980s, after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,78 that courts saw a rise in ATS 
litigation. ATS became a tool to bring claims against MNEs for MNEs’ 
offshore acts and provides a possible solution for holding MNEs 
responsible for their offshore subsidiaries’ acts.  
In 2004, the Supreme Court held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that the 
ATS is a jurisdictional statute only; it creates no cause of action.79 
Indeed, at the time of its adoption, the ATS “enabled federal courts to 
hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and 
recognized at common law.”80 These included three specific offenses: 
  
 74. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Keitner, supra note 3. 
 77. Sean Wajert, Second Circuit Upholds Dismissal of Alien Tort Statute Claim 
Against Corporate Defendants, MASS TORT DEFENSE (Sept. 27, 2010),  
http://www.masstortdefense.com/2010/09/articles/second-circuit-upholds-dismissal-of-
alien-tort-statute-claim-against-corporate-defendants. 
 78. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir 1980). 
 79. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). 
 80. Id. at 712. 
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“violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, 
and piracy.”81  
The Supreme Court did not, however, limit the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts under the ATS to those three offenses. Instead, the Court 
observed that “[a] related consideration is whether international law 
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the 
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a 
corporation or individual.”82 The court in Sosa concluded that 
international law governs the scope of liability for violations of 
customary international law under the ATS.  
Thus, we could conclude that the issue of corporate ATS liability is 
governed by international law itself. Therefore we will next discuss the 
corporate ATS liability to examine whether MNEs could be held liable 
under ATS. 
B. Conflicting Opinions over Corporate ATS Liability 
The question becomes then whether corporations may be held liable at 
all under the ATS. The Second Circuit court in Kiobel answered “no.”83 
In Kiobel, Nigerian nationals residing in the United States sued Dutch, 
British, and Nigerian corporations pursuant to the ATS, alleging that the 
corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing 
violations of the law of nations in Nigeria. The Second Circuit Court did 
a two-step analysis. Step one analyzed whether international or domestic 
law governs the corporate liability inquiry. Step two evaluated corporate 
liability through the lens of international law by analyzing tribunals, 
international treaties, and scholarly works. The Second Circuit held that 
all concepts of liability, adjective as well as substantive, must originate 
in international law norms. Further, applying Sosa, Kiobel limited those 
norms only to those which are “specific, universal and obligatory.” The 
Second Circuit Court found that no specific and universal norms provide 
that corporations may ever be held liable in any ATS context. 
  
 81. Id. at 715. 
 82. Id. at 732 n.20. 
 83. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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Finding only a few aiding and abetting outliers here and there,84 
which fall far short of “specific, universal and obligatory,” the court 
ended thirty years of ATS corporate and MNEs’ liability.85 Henceforth, 
at least in the Second Circuit, international law norms and ATS liability 
will apply only to individuals. 
The first post-Kiobel appellate ruling was the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals opinion in Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp.86 In Exxon, 
the court held that corporations may indeed have liability in ATS suits 
and called the Second Circuit opinion internally inconsistent and 
illogical.87 Several days after the Exxon ruling in Flomo v. Firestone 
Natural Rubber, the Seventh Circuit similarly held that corporations may 
have liability in ATS suits.88  Describing Kiobel as a rebel opinion, the 
court stated that the opinion was plainly “incorrect.”89 In Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto PLC, the Ninth Circuit joined the D.C. and Seventh Circuit post-
Kiobel rulings finding that corporations may have liability under the 
ATS.90 
A clear U.S. federal circuit court split on the issue of corporate ATS 
liability thus exists. Although the Supreme Court initially granted 
certiorari in Kiobel to decide the issue of corporate civil tort liability 
  
 84. The Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
provide for corporate liability, but only in the contexts to which those multinational 
treatises address themselves. 
 85. Kiobel, 621 F. 3d at 141. 
 86. Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated by Doe VIII v. 
Exxon Mobil Co., 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 87. Doe, 654 F.3d at 41 (finding that Kiobel’s “analysis conflates the norms of 
conduct at issue in Sosa and the rules for any remedy to be found in federal common law 
at issue here; even on its own terms, its analysis misinterprets the import of footnote 20 in 
Sosa and is unduly circumscribed in examining the sources of customary international 
law.”). 
 88. Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 89. Id. at 1017 (“All but one of the cases at our level hold or assume (mainly the 
latter) that corporations can be liable. The outlier is the split decision in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F. 3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), which indeed held that because 
corporations have never been prosecuted, whether criminally or civilly, for violating 
customary international law, there can’t be said to be a principle of customary 
international law that binds a corporation. The factual premise of the majority opinion in 
the Kiobel case is incorrect.” (citations omitted)). 
 90. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 748 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated by Rio 
Tinto PLC v. Sarei, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013). 
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under the ATS, it subsequently ordered re-argument on the broader 
question of “[w]hether and under what circumstances the [ATS] allows 
courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations 
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United 
States.”91 The Supreme Court did not rule on the corporate liability issue 
under the ATS. While the Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s Kiobel 
dismissal, it so ruled based upon the presumption against extraterritorial 
application of the ATS.92 The Supreme Court held that principles of 
presumption against extraterritoriality constrain courts exercising their 
power under ATS, and the ATS did not apply to violations of the law of 
nations occurring within sovereign territories other than the United 
States.93 
Thus, whether corporations are subjected to suit under the ATS is not 
clear. How MNEs can be held liable for their offshore subsidiaries’ acts 
after Kiobel is deserving of discussion. 
In all, after Filartiga in 1980, ATS litigation was on track to 
becoming a tool to bring claims against MNEs for offshore acts. The 
ATS provides the possible mechanism to hold MNEs liable for MNEs’ 
offshore subsidiaries’ acts. However, the Sosa court asserted that the 
ATS allowed federal courts to hear only limited claims defined by the 
law of nations and recognized at common law.94 The court in Sosa 
concluded that international law governs the scope of liability for 
violations of customary international law under the ATS.95 Whether there 
is corporate ATS liability is still not clear due to conflicting opinions in a 
series of recent federal circuit cases. Thus, imposing liability on MNEs 
for their offshore subsidiaries’ tortious acts is uncertain.  
  
 91. Order in Pending Case (Mar. 5, 2012), available at  
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/030512zr.pdf. 
 92. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (“On 
these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And even where 
the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with 
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”). 
 93. Id. at 1659-62. 
 94. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). 
 95. Id. at 733. 
2015] The Aftermath of Kiobel and Daimler 417 
IV. BARRIERS TO HOLD MNES LIABLE FOR OFFSHORE SUBSIDIARIES’ 
ACTS AFTER KIOBEL AND DAIMLER 
American case law has developed a number of doctrines making it 
difficult to bring claims involving foreign defendants. First, foreign 
defendants must possess “minimum contacts” with the forum state to 
satisfy the personal jurisdiction requirement.96 Second, the forum non 
conveniens doctrine could preclude a case from coming to federal court 
when there is an alternative forum that is more closely linked with the 
case.97 Third, the “non-justiciability” doctrine complicates the 
application of the ATS in practice.98 A judge may dismiss a case 
involving a “political” question on the basis of this doctrine.  
Imposing liability on MNEs for offshore subsidiaries’ act will meet 
traditional substantive and procedural barriers, including the principle of  
the presumption against extraterritorial application, the personal 
jurisdiction requirement and the principle of international comity. These 
obstacles can make claims to hold MNEs liable for offshore subsidiaries’ 
tortious acts much more difficult. Furthermore, the United States courts 
seem to have returned to the original territorial limitation, as illustrated in 
the recent Daimler case. These barriers have appeared recently and are 
stressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
A. Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application 
Historically, the exercise of prescriptive, judicial and enforcement 
jurisdiction has been limited territorially due to state sovereignty. In 
times when geographical space limited human activity, these rules were 
workable and legitimate. However, they were never absolute. With the 
advancement of the global economy, markets are no longer confined to 
  
 96. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating that 
the minimum contacts doctrine was originally designed to address interstate activities, but 
it could easily apply to activities between nations). 
 97. Patrick J. Borchers, Conflict-of-Laws Considerations in State Court Human 
Rights Actions, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 45, 59-60 (2013) (discussing application of forum 
non conveniens doctrine in state human rights litigation). 
 98. See Ugo Mattei & Jeffrey Lena, U.S. Jurisdiction over Conflicts Arising 
Outside of the United States: Some Hegemonic Implications, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 381, 385-86 (2001). 
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national borders and national interests are intertwined. Jurisdictional 
rules premised on the concept of territoriality no longer work well. 
Promoted by the need to adequately address these developments, changes 
did occur, such as the extension of domestic jurisdiction rules beyond 
state borders.99 The U.S. antitrust laws100 and federal securities laws101 
demonstrate the extraterritorial reach of U.S. statutes.  
However, the principles of presumption against extraterritorial 
application controlling claims under the ATS is still in use, as shown in 
the Supreme Court’s recent Kiobel case.102 The Supreme Court affirmed 
that the ATS could only be applied under the presumption against 
extraterritorial application.103 The Supreme Court explained this principle 
in detail in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.104 Foreign investors 
brought putative class action against Australian banking corporation, 
alleging securities fraud as to foreign transactions.105 The Supreme Court 
held that the presumption that federal law is not meant to have 
extraterritorial effect is applicable in all cases whenever a party seeks to 
give any federal legislation extraterritorial effect.106 And the Supreme 
Court asserted that it is a “longstanding principle of American law ‘that 
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to 
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”107 
When a statute provides for some extraterritorial application, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality operates to limit that provision to 
  
 99. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of 
Jurisdictional Conflict, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631, 632-36 (2009). 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
 101. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), abrogated by 
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (“Congress intended the 
Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors 
who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the 
domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American 
securities.”). 
 102. See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 105. Id. at 2873. 
 106. Id. at 2869. 
 107. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 
248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949)). 
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its terms. That the statutory language can possibly be interpreted to apply 
extraterritorially does not override the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. When a statute gives no clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application, it has none.    
The Supreme Court in the recent Daimler case in January 2014 
reaffirmed that the ATS can only apply within the territory of the United 
States.108 Thus, in holding MNEs liable for their offshore subsidiaries’ 
tortious acts under ATS, the principle of presumption against 
extraterritorial application is a difficult obstacle to cross.  
B. Personal Jurisdiction Requirement  
There are two personal jurisdiction categories: specific jurisdiction 
and general jurisdiction. The specific jurisdiction requirement 
encompasses cases in which the suit “arises out of [or relates to the] 
defendant’s contacts with the forum.”109 “General jurisdiction” is 
exercisable when a foreign corporation’s “continuous corporate 
operations within a state . . . [are] so substantial and of such a nature as 
to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely 
distinct from those activities.”110  
To satisfy specific jurisdiction for MNEs, the criterion of “presence” 
or “continuous and systematic business” are considered. In Doe I v. 
Unocal Corp., Burmese citizens brought a class action asserting various 
claims against the California-based MNE, Unocal; the French MNE, 
Total; and the gas company, MOGE, controlled by the Government of 
Myanmar.111 Due to State immunity, the court dismissed the claims 
against the Government of Myanmar and the gas company MOGE.112 
Total listed its stock on a United States exchange, and promoted sale of 
its stock. The court said that the French corporation’s contractual 
relations with the U.S. oil company did not constitute purposeful 
availment of the benefits and protections of California law, where the 
French corporation entered into those contracts either by fax and 
  
 108. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014). 
 109. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 
 110. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). 
 111. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1178 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 112. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. 888 (1997). 
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telephone or via meetings outside the United States.113 Furthermore, 
American law did not govern contracts related to the oil pipeline in 
Burma, as the oil would not be used in the United States.114 The court 
held that the corporation’s direct contacts with California were 
insufficient to warrant exercise of personal jurisdiction. Thus, a claim 
against a subsidiary for complicity in human rights violations in 
Myanmar was declared inadmissible.115 Therefore, imposing liability on 
MNEs for the acts of offshore subsidiaries under specific jurisdiction 
must meet the criterion of “presence” or “continuous and systematic 
business.”116 
To satisfy general jurisdiction for MNEs, the rules are not so clear. 
The Supreme Court in Daimler followed the traditional rule of general 
jurisdiction in its decision.117 In Daimler, plaintiffs, twenty-three 
Argentine citizens, sought to establish personal jurisdiction in a 
California federal court based upon the presence in California of two 
Mercedes Benz marketing offices and the offices of Mercedes Benz USA 
(MB USA), a Delaware Limited Liability Company. They alleged that 
they, or their close relatives, had been brutalized, tortured, or murdered 
by the Argentine military, which had ruled the country from 1976 to 
1983.118 They further alleged that Mercedes Benz Argentina (MBA) had 
aided and abetted the military.119 These were the links to Daimler 
Chrysler AG (DC AG), the German parent corporation: Argentina to 
California to Germany, with the lawsuit to be filed and tried in 
California.  
The Supreme Court in Daimler said that a defendant is subject to 
“general jurisdiction” only if its extensive contacts with the forum render 
it “at home” there.120 To satisfy the requirement of “at home,” the courts 
will consider the places where it is incorporated and where it maintains 
its principal place of business. It did not “foreclose the possibility” that 
  
 113. Doe I, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1185. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1185-86. 
 116. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945). 
 117. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 118. Id. at 748. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 754. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 
S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)). 
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there might exist an “exceptional case” in which a corporation’s contacts 
with a third state were “so substantial and of such a nature as to render 
the corporation at home in that State.”121 Thus, the exact requirements of 
general jurisdiction is not clear; more specifically, exactly when a MNE 
can satisfy the general jurisdiction is not clear.  
MNEs generally own various subsidiaries around the world. Thus, to 
hold MNEs liable for their offshore subsidiaries’ tortious acts under 
ATS, the personal jurisdiction requirement, especially the strict general 
jurisdiction requirement, is a difficult obstacle to cross. 
C. International Comity 
Comity is “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory 
to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due 
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its 
own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its 
laws.”122 No matter how MNEs are held liable for offshore subsidiaries’ 
acts, the issue of international comity is always involved.  
In Daimler, the Supreme Court asserted that we should pay attention 
to the risks to international comity posed by its expansive view of 
general jurisdiction.123 The expansive view of general jurisdiction, if 
adopted, will conflict with the practice of the European Union, which 
limits the suit of MNEs to three places: “statutory seat,” “central 
administration,” or “principal place of business.”124 “[F]oreign 
governments’ objections to some domestic courts’ expansive views of 
general jurisdiction have in the past impeded negotiations of 
international agreements on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement 
of judgments.”125 In Doe v. ExxonMobil, Indonesian peasants claimed 
damages from ExxonMobil for colluding in human rights violations 
committed by Indonesian army units.126 The U.S. federal government has 
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attempted to block this case, because allowing damages would harm 
foreign relations with Indonesia, a major ally in the war against 
terrorism.127 Dealing with this complaint would lead to an interference of 
foreign policy. 
Imposing liability on MNEs for their offshore subsidiaries’ tortious 
acts will potentially involve conflicts with foreign governments. 
International comity as a long practice exerts influence and can be a 
barrier in dealing with these offshore tortious acts.  
In all, after Kiobel asserted the territorial limitation of ATS litigation 
to hold MNEs liable for offshore subsidiaries’ acts, several barriers still 
exist to prevent holding MNEs liable for offshore subsidiaries’ acts. 
These barriers include the principle of presumption against 
extraterritorial application, the personal jurisdiction requirement shown 
in Daimler, and the principle of international comity. These barriers are 
reappearing and rising to prevent the imposition of liability on MNEs for 
the tortious acts of their offshore subsidiaries. 
V.   NEW EMERGING STRATEGIES TO HOLD MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES LIABLE FOR OFFSHORE SUBSIDIARIES’ ACTS AFTER 
KIOBEL AND DAIMLER 
After giving a full and careful analysis of the milestone cases Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and Daimler AG v. Bauman, there are 
several ways to hold MNEs liable for their subsidiaries’ acts, despite the 
aforementioned barriers. The first is to apply the ATS correctly to govern 
MNEs for subsidiaries’ acts following the majority opinion in Kiobel. 
The second alternative is to litigate in state court or apply state law under 
due process requirements. The third choice is to expand the doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil to the relationship between MNEs and 
subsidiaries, especially the principal-agent theory, to attribute 
jurisdiction to MNEs. The fourth option is to obtain consent from the 
parties to litigation. These strategies would be legal and effective ways to 
impose liability on MNEs for their offshore subsidiaries’ tortious acts. 
  
 127. See Jim Lobe, USA: State Department Tries to Get ExxonMobil Suit 
Dropped, CORP WATCH (Aug. 7, 2002),  
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=3469. 
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A.  Applying the ATS Correctly 
To impose liability on MNEs for their offshore subsidiaries’ tortious 
act, one strategy is to continue the ATS litigation but under correct 
requirements. Kiobel limited the ATS litigation under the principle of 
extraterritoriality. Half a year later, Daimler limited the ATS litigation by 
the requirement of personal jurisdiction. Therefore, we should conduct 
the ATS litigation under the principle of presumption against 
extraterritoriality and the requirement of personal jurisdiction. 
1.    Applying the ATS under Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality 
The Supreme Court in Kiobel held that courts should exercise their 
power under the principle of presumption against extraterritoriality and 
that the ATS applies only to violations of the law of nations occurring 
within the territory of the United States.128 If the tort occurs within U.S. 
territory, then the ATS can be applied. If we would like to hold MNEs 
liable for its offshore subsidiaries’ tortious acts, there generally could be 
four scenarios.  
One is to argue that the MNEs and their offshore subsidiaries are in 
complicity to commit the tortious acts that violate the law of nations. The 
complicit acts could cover “advice, counsel, encouragement, or back-up 
support.”129 Complicity is committed by large bodies of people acting in 
implicit cooperation, such as governments and corporations. Often, these 
ATS-related claims are based on alleged complicity in violations 
committed by the government of the State in which the MNE is active. 
The Doe I v. Unocal case offered to charge the MNE Unocal with 
complicity in human rights abuses under the ATS for the first time. The 
case concerned allegations that a subsidiary of Unocal was complicit 
with its security partner, the Myanmar military, in the assault, rape, 
torture, and murder of villagers in Burma.130 
Another is to assert that the MNEs “aided and abetted” the offshore 
subsidiaries’ tortious acts in the United States, and to, therefore, regard 
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 129. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, TORT LIABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 164 
(2008).                                                           
 130. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2002). 
424 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 23.2 
the violations of the law of nations to have occurred within the territory 
of the United States. To define “aiding and abetting,” the test set forth in 
Doe I v. Unocal131 could be applied here. “Practical assistance or 
encouragement which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the 
crime” and “actual or constructive [] knowledge that the accomplice’s 
actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime” would 
be regarded as “aiding and abetting.”132  
A third argument is that the MNEs directly and actively participated 
in the tortious acts with their offshore subsidiaries. MNEs and their 
offshore subsidiaries could both be major conductors of tortious acts in 
violations of laws of nations. Sometimes MNEs play a leading role in 
violations of laws of nations with offshore subsidiaries. For instance, a 
U.S. MNE and its Chinese subsidiary both could directly commit torture 
and murder of victims during a slavery transaction. In these cases, MNEs 
should be accountable for their direct participation of tortious acts with 
their offshore subsidiaries. 
Finally, if MNEs are held to be in reckless disregard as to whether 
victims would be subject to the subsidiaries’ violations of the law of 
nations,  the MNEs could be liable. There must be three elements to 
impose liability on the MNEs: (1) the MNEs either knew, or consciously 
disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the subsidiaries 
were conducting or about to conduct such tortious acts; (2) the tortious 
act concerned was within the effective responsibility and control of the 
MNEs; and (3) the MNEs failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measure to prevent these tortious acts.133 If these elements are met, then 
the MNEs should be accountable for tortious acts conducted by their 
subsidiaries under the MNEs’ effective authority and control, as a result 
of their failure to exercise proper control over such subsidiaries.134 
In all, these four scenarios could make MNEs accountable for the 
tortious acts of their offshore subsidiaries. 
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2.   Applying the ATS under the Requirement of Personal 
Jurisdiction 
ATS litigation should satisfy the personal jurisdiction requirement. 
The Supreme Court in Daimler reaffirmed this universal requirement. 
The Supreme Court followed the traditional rule of general jurisdiction in 
Daimler.  
Specific jurisdiction is easier to assert than general jurisdiction to 
impose liability on MNEs. Unlike specific jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court in Daimler only affirmed the general principle that general 
jurisdiction based on doing business is limited.135 Since International 
Shoe, the “minimum contacts” became the standard to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant, including a MNE.136 For specific 
jurisdiction, International Shoe recognized that “the commission of some 
single or occasional acts of the corporate agent in a state” may be enough 
to subject the corporation to jurisdiction in that State’s tribunals with 
respect to suits relating to that in-state activity.137 For general 
jurisdiction, a court may hear any and all claims against corporations 
when their contacts with the State are so “continuous and systematic” as 
to render them at home in the forum State.138 And thus, asserting specific 
jurisdiction requires less extensive contacts with the forum state than 
asserting general jurisdiction. In addition, since International Shoe, 
“specific jurisdiction has become the centerpiece of modern jurisdiction 
theory.”139 As is evident from these post-International Shoe decisions, 
“[s]pecific jurisdiction has been cut loose from Pennoyer’s sway.”140 
What’s more, the requirements of general jurisdiction are not clear 
enough in the aforementioned part. Therefore specific jurisdiction, 
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instead of general jurisdiction, could be asserted to cross the strict 
jurisdiction requirement.  
In sum, if applying the ATS correctly to hold MNEs liable for the acts 
of offshore subsidiaries, the ATS should be applied under the 
presumption against extraterritorial application shown in Kiobel and the 
requirement of personal jurisdiction shown in Daimler. Specific 
jurisdiction is an easier strategy rather than general jurisdiction, as 
demonstrated in Daimler. 
B. Litigating in State Court or Under State Law 
One alternative is to litigate in state court or apply state law. After 
Kiobel and Daimler, the United States federal courts seem to have closed 
the door for transnational litigation under ATS. If the litigation 
increasingly meets substantive and procedural barriers in U.S. federal 
courts, tort victims are more likely to consider filing in state courts or 
under state law. This may be part of the next wave of transnational 
litigation after Kiobel and Daimler.141 
The major benefit to litigating under state law in federal courts is that 
it avoids many substantive questions associated with pleading 
international law violations under the ATS. Sosa limited the types of 
international law violations available by using the terms “specific, 
universal, and obligatory.”142 The issue of corporate ATS liability is not 
clear in Kiobel. Tort victims may avoid Sosa’s limitations, such as 
corporate ATS liability, over which the ATS provides jurisdiction, by 
pleading their claims under state or foreign law,143 since “the same 
conduct that constitutes a violation of international human rights norms 
usually also violates the law of the place where it occurred and the law of 
the forum state.”144  
The benefit to using state law in state courts is that federal procedural 
doctrines, such as forum non conveniens, are only applicable in federal 
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court. In state courts or under state law, tort victims may avoid 
application of the federal forum non conveniens doctrine and strict 
federal pleading standards, and in some cases they may find a more 
sympathetic judge or jury.145  
For the strategy of litigating in state court or under state law to hold 
MNEs liable for their subsidiaries’ acts, the requirement of due process 
could prevent claims in state court.146 The application of U.S. remedies 
law to foreign facts also raises due process issues. In State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Supreme Court made clear 
that the Constitution prevents a U.S. state’s law of damages from 
“punishing a defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it 
occurred.”147 There are also difficult issues surrounding the application 
of international law in state courts.148 Moreover, state choice-of-law rules 
might point toward the application of foreign rather than state law. 
Lastly, the limits on the extraterritorial application of state statutes and 
state common law are unsettled.149 
Even though there are concerns with litigating in state court or under 
state law, these concerns are minor. The filing of ATS cases in state 
court or under state law may escape some of the federal procedural 
devices. Imposing liability on MNEs for the acts of offshore subsidiaries 
in state court or under state law would be the “next wave.”150  
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C. Expanding the Piercing the Corporate Veil Doctrine  
The third choice is to expand the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil to hold MNEs liable for their subsidiaries’ acts. There are several 
theories or standards to support piercing the corporate veil, including the 
contract to control, the operation to control and the current agency 
theory.  
1. Contract to Control for Piercing the Corporate Veil 
In Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., plaintiff labor leaders had allegedly 
been held against their will, tortured, and some murdered in revenge for 
past labor activism in Columbia.151 The bottlers, one of which was 
Bebidas y Alimentos do Urab, collaborated with paramilitary groups.152 
Four thousand Columbian trade unionists had been killed since 1986.153 
The plaintiffs tried to hold Coca-Cola Columbia and its parent, Coca-
Cola Co. liable as a U.S. MNE.154 Coca Cola Columbia had contracts 
with the bottlers.155 The court held that the contracts gave Coca-Cola 
only an ability to protect the trademark, not the day-to-day control which 
could cause ATS liability to reach up the corporate chain.156 
In a similar case Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., foreign 
nationals who were allegedly transferred in secret to other countries for 
detention and interrogation pursuant to Central Intelligence Agency’s 
(CIA) extraordinary rendition program brought an action under the ATS 
against a company that purportedly assisted in the program.157  The five 
plaintiffs had been suspected of terrorism, and subjected to rendition in 
countries such as Egypt in which security personnel subjected them to 
torture and long periods of confinement, bereft of judicial proceedings or 
other intervention.158 Defendant Jeppesen, a subsidiary of MNE Boeing 
Co., had provided fueling and flight guidance to the aircraft and crews 
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that had transported the plaintiffs.159 The case is worth noting because the 
alleged link to the corporate actor was a contract.  
We could conclude from the dictum of the Coca-Cola and the 
Jeppesen cases that daily or weekly control obtained through contract is 
sufficient for ATS purposes. If the MNEs dominate the detailed contract 
with their subsidiaries, such as the contract between DCAG and 
MBUSA160 and the MNEs control their subsidiaries through such 
detailed contract, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil may apply to 
impose liability on MNEs for their offshore subsidiaries’ tortious acts. 
2.   The Operation Standard to Control for Piercing the 
Corporate Veil 
The court in United States v. Bestfoods held that other persons and 
corporations are responsible for Superfund cleanup costs if they were 
either an “owner” of the site or an “operator” of the person who 
committed the offending acts.161 Determining who qualifies as an 
operator is a federal question with courts borrowing veil piercing law 
from state laws.162 
CPC International Inc. (CPC), Bestfood’s predecessor, owned Ott 
Chemical Co., of Muskegon, Michigan, from 1965 to 1972.163 Ott’s plant 
site was declared a Superfund site.164 In 1989, the United States sued 
Bestfoods for tens of millions of dollars in cleanup costs.165 Justice 
Souter applied the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to find when a 
parent corporation may become an operator of a subsidiary.166 
Justice Souter stated that “[t]he question is not whether the parent 
operates the subsidiary, but rather whether it operates the facility which 
the subsidiary owns.”167 The former is permissible. Many of the parent’s 
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actions are merely an exercise of its democratic rights, such as electing 
directors, engaging in long run strategic planning, appointing principal 
officers, and having joint directors and officers.168 Even some operation 
of the subsidiary’s facility is permissible, such as “monitoring of the 
subsidiary’s performance, supervision of the subsidiary’s finance and 
capital budget decisions, and articulation of general policies and 
procedures.”169 
By contrast, when the parent sends its own employees to participate in 
the daily or weekly operating decisions, or otherwise attempts to 
influence those decisions, the parent may lose its limited liability. CPC, 
under its successor name, Bestfoods, could raise the issue of the lose of 
its limited liability due to the fact the director had “played a conspicuous 
part in dealing with the toxic risks emanating from the operation of the 
plant.”170 
Thus, parents may operate their subsidiaries but not the facilities of 
their subsidiaries. Such a test comes close to establishing a bright line 
test for what parent corporations can do and what they should avoid in 
corporate group contexts. By the same token, Bestfoods could instruct 
courts as to when to pierce the corporate veil under the ATS. If a MNE 
sends its own employees to directly participate in the daily or weekly 
operating decisions of its offshore subsidiary, the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil could apply. 
3. Principal-Agent Theory for Piercing the Corporate Veil 
Agencies come in many sizes and shapes, “[o]ne may be an agent for 
some business purposes and not others so that the fact that one may be an 
agent for one purpose does not make him or her an agent for every 
purpose.”171 A subsidiary, for example, might be its parent’s agent for 
claims arising in the place where the subsidiary operates, yet not its agent 
regarding claims arising elsewhere. Many courts use principal-agent 
analogies to uphold veil piercing allegations. “When a court finds that a 
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subsidiary corporation exists solely to carry out the owner’s agenda, 
having no independent reason for its own existence, then the corporation 
is found to have been the mere agent or instrumentality of the owner.”172 
The corporation is disregarded and the human owner or parent 
corporation is held liable.173 To invoke the theory, there must be “such 
domination of finances, policies and practices that the controlled 
corporation has, so to speak, no separate mind, will or existence of its 
own and is but a business conduit for its principal.”174 
Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., a recent ATS opinion by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, showed what kind of evidence may 
indicate an agency relationship.175 It is appropriate for the parent to 
monitor the subsidiary’s performance, supervise the subsidiary’s 
financial decisions, and articulate general policies and procedures.176 To 
determine whether a parent has strayed over this appropriate line, and the 
subsidiary has become the agent of the parent, the Ninth Circuit 
implemented a two-step test.177 First, the agent-subsidiary must be 
sufficiently important to the parent corporation that if it did not have a 
representative, the parent corporation would undertake to perform 
substantially similar services.178 Second, the parent must have the right to 
control the subsidiary, but does not need to exert control in fact.179 Based 
on the detailed General Distributor Agreement and specific facts of that 
case, the court found that the wholly-owned United States subsidiary, 
which served as the general distributor of German manufacturer’s 
automobiles in the United States, was the manufacturer’s agent for 
general jurisdictional purposes.180 Furthermore, exercising personal 
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jurisdiction over German automobile manufacturer comported with fair 
play and substantial justice.181 
The Supreme Court asserted, however, that the analysis of the agency 
theory which the Ninth Circuit relied on was wrong.182 The primary first 
step is wrongful and pro jurisdiction.183 “Anything a corporation does 
through an independent contractor, subsidiary, or distributor is 
presumably something that the corporation would do ‘by other means’ if 
the independent contractor, subsidiary, or distributor did not exist.”184 
The Ninth Circuit’s agency theory could subject foreign MNEs to 
general jurisdiction as long as they have an in-state subsidiary, which 
would go beyond the “sprawling view of general jurisdiction” that was 
rejected in Goodyear.185  
However, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether a foreign 
corporation may be subject to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the 
contacts of its in-state subsidiary. It means that the Supreme Court did 
not deny the applicability of the principal-agent theory for the purpose of 
personal jurisdiction. The principal-agent theory could still be applied to 
supply personal jurisdiction as long as the analysis of agency is correct, 
even though it is unlikely. In fact, in a footnote in Daimler, the Supreme 
Court said that an “[a]gency relationship[] . . . may be relevant to the 
existence of specific jurisdiction.”186 Furthermore, “the commission of 
some single or occasional acts of the corporate agent in a state” may 
sometimes “be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit” 
on related claims.187 Thus, it is possible to apply principle-agent theory to 
impose liability on MNEs for their offshore subsidiaries’ acts. 
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A great advantage of the agency theory is that it crosses many layers. 
The theory may make the great-grandparent household name corporation 
answer for acts done by the great-grandchild subsidiary. To determine 
whether we can use such agency, the court would look at the detailed 
agreement between them on a case-by-case basis. 
In all, a contract to control, daily or weekly control, or the principal-
agent theory could be possible ways to hold MNEs liable for offshore 
subsidiaries’ acts. As for which theory to apply to pierce the corporate 
veil, we could work on a case-by-case basis. 
D. Obtaining Consent from Parties  
MNEs which have not been served in one jurisdiction can 
nevertheless voluntarily appear and submit themselves to jurisdiction. In 
such cases MNEs are said to have “consented” to jurisdiction. Under the 
consent theory, MNEs register in states as a condition of doing business 
there and therefore consent to be sued there. In addition, MNEs may 
consent to the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction by agreeing to a 
contract that includes a forum-selection clause.188 
The most relevant case to impose liability on MNEs for the acts of 
offshore subsidiaries due to consent by the parties is In re Union Carbide 
Corporation.189 A U.S. MNE Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) had a 
fifty and nine-tenths percent interest in the Indian company Union 
Carbide India Limited (UCIL) that ran the chemical plant that 
experienced a tragic accident killing and injuring thousands of people.190 
The plaintiffs sued under both state and Indian law for negligent 
supervision and bad design of the plant.191 The injuries occurred in India, 
but the parent’s contributions to the accident involved U.S. as well as 
Indian-based conduct. Some 145 class actions in federal district courts in 
the United States was commenced on behalf of the victims.192 The 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation assigned the actions to the 
Southern District of New York where they became the subject of a 
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consolidated complaint. The parent MNE, UCC, “consented” to the sole 
jurisdiction of the Southern District of New York.193 This was not an 
ATS litigation. Also Daimler was not a factor because UCC was sued in 
multiple jurisdictions. The cases were consolidated by consent in the 
Southern District of New York.  
Therefore, obtaining consent from parties is a simple and effective 
strategy to impose liability on MNEs for offshore subsidiaries’ acts. This 
strategy does not need to involve the ATS, and the requirement of 
personal jurisdiction is satisfied due to consent from the parties of the 
litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
MNEs play significant roles with their worldwide subsidiaries in the 
global economy. How to impose liability on large, complex MNEs for 
the tortious acts of offshore subsidiaries is a pressing issue. National 
courts, international norms and MNEs’ internal codes of conduct cannot 
legally and effectively hold MNEs liable. The U.S. ATS rose to provide 
such a mechanism for the past several decades. ATS suits have caused 
some confusion, however, such as with respect to the corporate ATS 
liability issue. 
Kiobel limited subject matter jurisdiction in transnational human 
rights cases under the ATS. Half a year later, with facts similar to those 
in Kiobel, the Supreme Court in Daimler asserted that ATS litigation 
should also satisfy the strict general jurisdiction requirement. Various 
barriers to post-Kiobel and post-Damiler strategies to hold MNEs liable 
for the acts of offshore subsidiaries are difficult to surpass. The United 
States seems to have closed the door for transnational litigation to hold 
MNEs liable for the tortious acts of offshore subsidiaries. The Supreme 
Court said that U.S. federal courts did not have a “strong interest in 
adjudicating and redressing international human rights abuses” in 
Daimler.194 The United States appeared to be a haven for MNEs being 
charged with their offshore susidiaries’ tortious acts.  
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However, several alternatives to hold MNEs liable for the tortious 
acts of offshore subsidiaries after Kiobel and Daimler might achieve 
success, including correct application of the ATS, litigating in state court 
or under state law, expanding the corporate veil doctrine, and obtaining 
consent from parties. Among these four strategies, the simplest 
alternative is to obtain consent from parties to the litigation, since this 
strategy does not need involve the ATS and the requirements of personal 
jurisdiction could be easily satisfied due to consent. Also, applying the 
ATS correctly is effective as long as the ATS’s requirements are 
satisfied. Applying the principal-agent theory to pierce the corporate veil 
is not so easy since the courts haven’t provided the clear and correct 
standard of agency theory. 
The combination of these strategies would produce wonderful results 
and lead the next wave of transnational litigation. Pleading specific 
jurisdiction under the principle of the presumption against extraterritorial 
application is easy to satisfy the ATS requirements. If there is a correct 
principal-agency standard in the future, then applying principal-agent 
theory to pierce the corporate veil to plead specific jurisdiction against 
MNE could be the next wave of transnational litigation. 
 
